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LIVING WITH ANIMALS
Freya Mathews
'Without animals,' says Peter, a Maasai nomad interviewed in the New
Internationalist1, 'life isn't worth living'.
Sitting here in my inner-city backyard writing this, with a circle of
attentive little upturned canine and feline faces surrounding me, and my
cranky duck tugging at my shoelaces, I could not be in more heartfelt
agreement. But how many people today would share this sentiment? For
how many would it be football that makes life worth living, or cars, or
opera, or ice-skating? Is there anything to ground the conviction that I
want to defend here, that the company of non-human animals is a
necessary part of human life, in a way that football, cars, opera and iceskating manifestly are not, and that we relinquish or forego it at our
peril?
There are two parts to this question. The first is, is it important for us, for
our own well-being or the realization of our human potential, that we
live in intimate commensal relations with animals? The second is, is it
important for the environment that we live in such relations? Does the
world need us to continue to live in our ancestral communalism with
animals?
My view is that our present estrangement, as human beings, from both
the natural world (as evidenced in the environmental crisis) and from
ourselves (as evidenced in the intense neuroticization of life in
contemporary 'advanced' societies) is due at least in part to the
progressive removal of animals from our day-to-day urban reality;
consequently I shall argue that, in order to address both the
environmental crisis and our own crisis of consciousness, we need to
find ways of restoring animals to the human household.
I cannot hope here to exhaust the discussion invited by this question, or
even to do justice to its larger significance. I shall merely offer several
relatively straightforward arguments in favour of human-animal
commensality, and then offer a very personal reflection on the deeper
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cosmological significance of these relations, as this has unfolded for me
through my own experience.

Our Need for Animal Company
Firstly then, are intimate connections with animals foundational to our
human well-being? It is by now a well-established research finding that
people who enjoy the day-to-day friendship of animals, or who are,
according to contemporary parlance, 'pet owners'2, are healthier in
various respects than people who do not: they tend to visit the doctor less
frequently, use less medication, have lower cholesterol and blood
pressure levels, recover more quickly from illness and suffer less from
feelings of loneliness.3 Indeed, it has been estimated that 'pet ownership'
saves the Australian health care system one and a half billion dollars per
year.4
Why might this be so? One reason may be that companionate
relationships with animals defuse a lot of the socially generated pressure
in our lives. Animals are non-judgmental friends. They do not compete
with us. Hence we can relax with them, and enjoy spontaneous affection
and cathartic physical closeness: we can 'be ourselves' in the presence of
such companions, since they have no socially acquired expectations of
us. They offer us emotional and psychological release.
Friendships with animals may be stress-reducing in a further way.
Emotional involvement with creatures who do not share our human goals
and aspirations, our system of values, enables us to gain an external
perspective on those values. It enables us to imagine how odd or
arbitrary our human priorities might appear from a non-human
perspective. When revealed in this light, socially-prescribed imperatives
have less hold on us - we can achieve a certain distance from them, a
certain detachment. We become less driven, less enslaved to abstract
ideals and images, and hence more receptive to our actual bodily and
instinctual needs, more self-accepting, with all the implications for
health and healing that flow from this.
It does not seem too far-fetched, to me, to speculate that there may even
be a direct physiological dependence of humans on animal
companionship that would help to explain why people who enjoy that
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companionship are healthier than others. Some evolutionary theorists are
currently arguing that our ancestors' early genetic 'contract' with certain
animals - particularly dogs - enabled us to develop the characteristics
that now mark us as human. According to this theory5, it was our
association with dogs - which was initiated at least in part by the dogs
themselves, possibly as early as one hundred thousand years ago6 which enabled our ancestors to dispense with something that is otherwise
mandatory for mammalian predators, namely an acute sense of smell:
when dogs agreed to join us in the hunt, they could henceforth do our
sniffing for us. The advantage for us of delegating our scenting function
in this way was that we could thereby dispense with our muzzle. Sans
muzzle, we could achieve frontal vision, and hence improved hand-eye
co-ordination, where this in turn was a precondition for the development
of our tool-making capability. The retraction of the muzzle also entailed
the shrinkage and refinement of the tongue, which thereby became
capable of the short, highly differentiated sounds required for speech.
According to this theory then, it was through a functional interdependence with dogs that we became human. (This theory adds an
amazingly literal dimension to the Aboriginal myth of human origins
recounted so beautifully by Deborah Bird Rose in her book, Dingo
Makes Us Human.7) The deal for dogs, in this scenario, was of course
that they received board and lodgings; history has resoundingly
vindicated the proto-dogs' evolutionary choice.
If this evolutionary story is accepted - and the fact that nearly all known
human communities have included dogs helps to bear it out - then it is
possible that human beings have a physiological need for contact with
dogs. Our bodies may unconsciously respond to certain subtle canine
emanations, just as women's bodies, for instance, unconsciously respond
to the subtle menstrual signals emanating from their female house mates.
If our compact with dogs indeed rested on certain evolutionary
imperatives, then it is not unreasonable to suppose that that compact may
be reinforced by other more direct, physiological forms of interdependency. If all dogs were banished from our cities - and many
indignant citizens are calling for just such a ban - a massive malaise in
the human population might ensue. Such a malaise might take directly
physical form, such as immunological decline; recent evidence that
raising children without exposure to ('dirty') animals tends to weaken
their immune systems, where this renders them susceptible to allergies,
counts in favour of this kind of interpretation. But the malaise might
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also take a more psychological form - it might be more akin to the
depression which is already present in epidemic proportions in our
relatively animal-free 'advanced' industrial civilizations. It might
manifest as a vague sense of incompleteness or meaninglessness, leading
to emotional neediness and compensating material acquisitiveness. Or it
might be experienced as an existential loneliness which no amount of
intra-species socialising can assuage.
Consider the latter possibility for a moment. If we have lived in intimate
community with dogs, for instance, for anything up to a hundred
thousand years, wouldn't it be likely that we would have a distinct
psychological need for their company, a need that could not be satisfied
by human substitutes? Anyone who habitually walks in open spaces with
a close canine friend can testify to the unique appropriateness of dogs as
walking companions. Bounding along with infectious interest and joy in
their surroundings, they leave us free - free to think our own thoughts
and to observe those surroundings keenly ourselves - while nevertheless
staying faithfully within our orbit, maintaining an unobtrusive closeness
with us. Alternatively, anyone who has spent time in Aboriginal
settlements can testify to the feeling of comfort that a dog clan can lend
to a community, provided of course that the dogs are not themselves a
source of danger. Their constant mingling with the people, their presence
at meetings and their forays onto the football field, their barking and
carrying on amongst themselves on the margins of human activities, add
a safe, convivial and companionable dimension to life, a dimension that
has been entirely lost in the larger cities. Nor is it only dogs which
provide a distinctive quality of companionship. To sit in the garden with
an affectionate duck can afford a uniquely peaceful interlude in the daily
round. To travel with horses or camels can give a far richer sense of
journeying than can either solitary travel or travel with exclusively
human company.
In light of the emotional and psychological satisfactions that we have
experienced for thousands of years in the wider social world of the
'mixed community'8 of humans and animals then, isn't it reasonable to
assume that, deprived of these satisfactions, we moderns might feel
unfulfilled and obscurely lonely, even if we have never experienced
these satisfactions at first hand, for ourselves. And mightn't this
unfulfilment and loneliness contribute to the social malaise of modern
life?
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These are some of the reasons why it might be important for our own
well-being to continue the ancient human tradition of living in mixed
households or communities. But why might it be important for Nature
itself that we honour and maintain our ancestral commensal links with
animals?
Why Nature Needs Us to Live in Company with Animals
If animal companions help to make us less driven, competitive and
acquisitive, as I argued earlier, then their presence in our lives works
against the world-destroying ethos of capitalism, with its competitive
individualism and consumerism. That is to say, if animals help to bring
us down to earth, deflating our modern ambitions and pretensions by
exposing them to inter-species scrutiny, then we shall be less anxious to
remain in the race for success, wealth and power, where it is this race, on
a mass scale, which is driving the engines of capitalism. Indeed, to the
extent that we share our lives with animals, we shall not only be less
willing but less able to adapt to the regime of order and control,
efficiency and discipline, which is a prerequisite of capitalist production:
animals constantly disrupt our life and work with unpredictable
contingencies - escapes, fights, sudden illnesses, injuries, embarrassing
lapses. They bring an element of slapstick and anarchy into the cool,
smart, self-absorbed world of business and public affairs. They make us
miss work; they muss up the perfect clothes, perfect hair, that are needed
to assure our 'professionalism', our presentability, in this public world;
they strew shit and dirt around the manicured gardens, and leave paw
marks through the tidy houses, that announce our hard-won social status.
They gently lead us back from the obsessive quest which is definitive of
the modern ethos and which is at the root of the environmental crisis:
the quest to usurp and transcend Nature,9 to place ourselves above and
beyond its reach, to inhabit a kind of glossy advertiser's version of
Plato's heaven, in which moth and rust doth not corrupt, because they are
kept at bay by chemical warfare, and where thieves do not break in and
steal, because the place is patrolled by security guards. In other words,
by staying in touch with our animal kin, we stand a greater chance of
seeing through the dangerous illusions of a world increasingly dedicated
to capitalist ideals of wealth, power and success that are defined in stark
opposition to, or at the expense of, Nature.
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Another reason why, as environmentalists, we should encourage
commensal relations between animals and people, especially children, is
that such relations presumably help to engender human empathy towards
animals in general, including those in the wild. When people discover
the unique personalities and communicative capabilities of their animal
friends and familiars, they are logically drawn to credit other animals
with such potentialities too, and to extend to them, in principle, a degree
of consideration commensurate with that which, they have realised, is
due to the animals of their acquaintance. In this way, animal companions
can serve as 'ambassadors' for animal life generally, awakening in us new
levels of awareness and responsibility vis a vis the natural world.
It must be admitted, however, that this 'ambassador' argument is, prima
facie, open to objection. In the first place, what of the rural people,
whom we have all encountered, who have been in contact with animals
throughout their lives, yet who nevertheless treat all animals as totally
inconsiderable robots? Then there are the people who enjoy
companionate relationships with particular, privileged animals, yet
continue to handle the rest with callous indifference. How are we to
account for the fact that daily contact with animals has not, in these
instances, led to a more considerate attitude towards animals in general?
One way of accounting for this is via the hypothesis that it was the fact
of domestication itself, in its more grossly instrumental forms, which led
to our cultural objectification of animals. That is, according to some
theorists10, in drawing animals into our domiciliary space, and raising
them within the circle of the human clan, and then slaughtering them for
food or other purposes, we in fact violated the taboo against violence
towards kin. The moral gravity of this transgression then required that
we rationalize our action by denying the moral significance of domestic and by extension, other - animals, reducing them to the status of objects
that may be produced and consumed without the slightest compunction.
In other words, to justify the utilization of animals raised, like kin, within
the human domain, we invented an ideology of animals as objects, which
effectively closed our eyes to their otherwise manifest subjectivity.
Ideology unquestionably can blind us to the subjectivity of others, as is
plainly attested by the phenomena of slavery, racism and sexism in the
human context. So the mere fact that we keep 'pets', or come into daily
contact with other animals, will not of itself ensure that we develop
empathy for them. Communication between self and other can occur only
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when occlusive ideologies have been exposed and removed. For
companion animals to serve as moral 'ambassadors' for the animal world
at large then, anthropocentric prejudices have first to be set aside.
If it is accepted that companion animals do induce in us a new moral
seriousness about animals generally, then a question arises concerning
the status of domestic animals used for productive purposes . Does this
new moral seriousness condemn the utilization of animals for such
purposes? If so, is it really in the interests of the species in question,
since those species owe their very existence, at the present time, to the
fact that they are so utilized. How ironical it would be if the dawning of
this new moral seriousness led not to an animal renaissance, but to the
further retreat of animals both from their present evolutionary
strongholds and from our own lives? The question then, is whether it is
possible to reconcile empathy for animals with their domestic
utilization?
The short answer to this question is, I think, that such reconciliation of
empathy and use is possible to the extent that utilization is of net benefit
to the animals concerned. When those animals are considered as species
rather than as individuals, it is clear that productive forms of
domestication have been of net benefit to them: domestic animals are
some of the few animal species still flourishing in a world of declining
biodiversity. However, the kind of empathy induced by intimate
relationships with animal companions leads us to consider animals as
individuals rather than as mere instances of species. So although
reproductive success at the level of species is obviously a necessary
condition for an individual's existence, and is in this sense in its interests,
it is, equally obviously, not a sufficient condition for the individual's
well-being.
To reconcile utilization with empathy, we need to be assured that the life
that our exploitative intentions bestow on an individual domestic animal
affords both the experiential opportunities and the requisite life span to
enable it to achieve a significant degree of the form of self-realization
appropriate to its particular kind. This implies that the use we may
justifiably make of animals will vary according to their species: what
may be an acceptable use of one species with a particular set of needs
and sensibilities may not be acceptable for a species differently
endowed. In particular, while humane killing of animals who lack any
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consciousness of death may be admissible, the killing of animals who
understand and fear death, and who grieve for their own dead (as do
elephants and perhaps chimps), may be completely inadmissible,
involving as it would the systematic infliction of intolerable suffering.
Such suffering may, from the point of view of the animals in question,
cancel the benefits of being alive. (This is evidenced by the fact that such
animals can pine to death when bereaved11).
In short, I think the fact that domestic utilization affords evolutionary
niches for certain species, in a world of disappearing niches, is a prima
facie reason for regarding such utilization as compatible with respect.
However a full-blown attitude of empathy - such as we develop through
intimate association with animal companions - requires that the forms of
utilization we countenance be compatible with the self-realization of the
animals used, where this implies that different forms and degrees of
utilization will be appropriate for different species. I would also add that,
once we have acknowledged the subjectivity and moral significance of
the animals we use, and the moral gravity of our practices of utilization,
it becomes incumbent on us to develop cultural expressions of respect,
gratitude and indebtedness for the lives we have thus dedicated to our
own ends. In this way, our attitude towards domestic animals can
develop more affinity with the familial attitudes of hunter-gatherer
peoples towards the wild species that constitute their prey.
When domestic utilization of animals is subject to the qualifications I
have outlined above, I think it is not only consistent with empathetic
concern for the interests of animals: it is actually required by such
concern. As environmentalists, committed to the maximal preservation of
non-human life on earth, yet facing the cold, hard fact that in the 21st
century, the processes of urbanization and industrialization that have
been synonymous with the disenchantment and tragic devastation of the
non-human world are only going to accelerate and intensify, don't we
have to admit that one of our best chances for 'saving Nature' is by
bringing Nature back into the human domain. We have, for the last few
centuries, witnessed the runaway humanization of Nature; now let us
inaugurate the wholesale naturalization of human habitat. Our cities are
one of the major biological habitats of the future, and our task, as
environmentalists, is to ensure that they provide the best opportunities
for non-human life that we can devise. We can do this partly by
increasing the amount of urban habitat for wildlife. Such habitat can be
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created by way of indigenous plantings and by permacultural programs
of food production in the city. Buildings can also be designed or adapted
to create, rather than exclude, habitat opportunities for wild animals (by
way of stork-friendly chimneys, for instance, and roofs that
accommodate bats and nesting birds). However we can also increase the
urban opportunities for non-human life by finding new ways for animals
to 'earn their living' in the city.
How might we envisage some of these new ways? The usefulness of
sheep as lawn-mowers has been appreciated by a church in my own local
neighborhood, and there is no reason why other urban land-holders,
including local councils, should not follow suit. Sheep have also been
used for traffic calming in the Netherlands, and strategic use of horsedrawn vehicles - for tourist rides or milk deliveries, for instance - could
serve a similar purpose. City farms afford educational opportunities for
urban schoolchildren increasingly distanced from the realities of food
production. The possibilities for reintegrating animals productively into
urban life are as limitless as our imaginations. However, the principal
way in which animals can 'earn their living' in the city is still, I think, via
their companionate role. The exclusive reign of the dog and the cat in
this connection needs to be challenged, and the adaptability of other
species to the human hearth and home investigated. There is immense
scope for the conservation particularly of - sometimes endangered native species in such a program of domestication. Species such as the
quoll, or native cat, and the fruit bat, are reputed to make affectionate
and contented hearth companions, and the domestic potentialities of
many smaller, endangered wallabies, such as quokkas and bettongs, are,
so far as I am aware, relatively unexplored. (The quokkas on Rottnest
Island, offshore from Perth, Western Australia, have already adapted to
the kind of semi-tame, dump-side existence which is, according to
certain evolutionary theorists12, the first step in a species' self-surrender
to domestication.) Our reluctance, as 'animal lovers', to countenance
confinement of wild animals, and the loss of autonomy that
domestication entails, must be off-set, I think, by the recognition that we
are just another niche in the biosphere, and hence ourselves a part of
Nature (the niche in question being one which many species have in the
past successfully occupied of their own free will). This reluctance must
also be offset against the as yet undreamt-of possibilities for
conservation13 that domestication offers.
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The 'green' city of the future, then, would be a mixed community rich in
habitat opportunities for a great diversity of animal species. This
reintegration of animals into human life would also help to expand
human imaginative and empathetic horizons, undermining
anthropocentrism and reinforcing commitment to the protection of the
non-human world. At the same time, the multiple contacts with animals
that it would afford would enhance the health and sanity of the human
population.
To envisage the green city of the future as a mixed community in this
way would of course involve considerable re-thinking of current urban
and environmental planning principles. Restrictions on the ownership of
native animals would have to be revised, and new local council
regulations allowing for the responsible keeping of a wide range of 'pets'
would be required. Housing would be designed with the needs of both
wild and tame non-human occupants in mind. Such demands on design
would not in themselves militate against the medium density housing
currently favoured by environmental town planners, but they would
require that 'urban consolidation' be counter-balanced by large increases
in communal green space. Public spaces would also have to be rendered
more hospitable to animals, with protection from traffic, and areas
designated and set aside for inter-species exercise (dogs would
presumably have to be kept apart from donkeys, miniature pigs and
quokkas, for instance!). Urban planners who currently concentrate on
high density development for the sake of energy conservation and
curtailment of urban sprawl forget that, in excluding non-human beings
from the city and creating human ghettos, they are intensifying the
anthropocentric mind-set of urban populations, and thereby reinforcing
the deepest roots of the environmental crisis. The green city is one which
not only conserves energy and utilizes existing infrastructure, but also
challenges the traditional conceptual division between humankind and
Nature, making itself a frontier of ecological possibility and opening its
people to the degree of contact with non-human life required to awaken
their ecological sensibilities.
A Responsive World: Some Personal Reflections
These then are some of the reasons why I think that our living with
animals is important both for us and for them. However, this
commensality shapes not only our ethical attitudes towards non-human
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individuals and species, but our very sense of the world. I have not yet
brought this larger significance of the relationship fully to light, nor can I
hope to do so with any pretence of completeness. In order to capture a
little of this cosmological significance however, I would like to recount,
in these concluding pages, the experiential origins of my own conviction
that 'without animals, life isn't worth living'.
I grew up surrounded by loving animals on what today would be
described as a hobby farm, situated on the rural outskirts of Melbourne,
Australia.. These animals included dogs and cats, ducks, geese, hens,
and, at one stage, a turkey. There were brief episodes with sheep and
cows. The main focus of my entire childhood, however, was my ponies.
My first pony, and the horses that came after her, were my day-long
playmates and confidants. It was to them that I recited my earliest poems,
and to them that I ran when I was hurt or excited. They nuzzled me in the
same soft, considerate way whatever the occasion. I chose their company
not for want of family and friends, but for its own sake. The form of
intimacy that grew up between us was qualitatively different from
anything that could have developed between myself and human persons.
It was a kind of uncluttered closeness, or being-with, which existed
despite the fact that our subjectivities were, in terms of content, mutually
unknowable. We took it for granted, on either side, that this
unknowability did not matter, that our psyches could touch and pervade
each other, without need for explanations or self-disclosures, such as
those conveyable by language. These animals were, for me, 'primary
others', in the psychoanalytic sense; they were not substitutes for, but
additional to, significant humans, nor could humans substitute for them.
My subjectivity - my sense of self and world - was constituted through
my 'object relations'14 with these animals just as fundamentally as it was
through my relations with primary human others.
Domestic animals were not the only non-human influences shaping my
sense of self and world in those early days. There were also kindly
ancient gum trees on our land - we knew they dated from before
colonization because they bore canoe scars in their trunks. And there was
the creek, steeped in elemental mystery for me, yet at the same time busy
and loquacious, swirling with news of other unknown yet connected
places. These, together with my animal family, and the wild birds and
snakes, all contributed to my sense of a world of communicative
presences beyond the circle of human concerns.
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Nor was my childhood home the only place which turned my psyche
outward in this way. There was also an old sheep station on the vast
western plains of New South Wales, which I occasionally visited in
school holidays. It was no ordinary sheep station, but, even in those days,
a relic of an earlier era. The owner, an old timer with eyes as wide as the
blue desert sky, had been born in the homestead and raised on the
property, and he ran the place in the pre-mechanical style, with the aid of
stock ponies, dogs and horse-drawn buggies. We children were out all
day in the searing sun on the saltbush plains, lunching out of battered
tuckerboxes, racing our ponies, chasing kangaroos, emus and wild pigs
with delirious excitement. Back at the homestead, animals filled our
every waking moment: there were sheep and lambs, of course, as well as
the ponies, most of whom spent the main part of the year in a large herd
out on the range, only coming in for a tour of duty now and again, as the
need arose. (These tough but happy little horses lived to extraordinary
ages. One died recently at the age of forty-five!) Cattle, pigs, tribes of
chooks, ducks and geese, a flock of diminutive long-haired bush goats,
an army of dogs, and at different times tame emus and kangaroos all
congregated around the homestead. An old white goat named Snowy and
a cocoa-coloured hand-reared filly clattered about on the wide back
verandah. A sack containing a recently orphan joey usually hung from
the clothes line over the enormous wood-fired stove in the kitchen.
Compassion and fondness for animals jostled, in the daily round, with
unabashed slaughter and brutality. From my saddle, I witnessed mother
kangaroos being torn to shreds by dogs, 'for fun'; emus, in flight from our
young stockman friends, failing to clear a fence, becoming entangled in
the wire instead, and being bludgeoned to death with a fence-post; and
back at the homestead, pigs uttering torture-chamber screams as their
throats were cut and their still-convulsing bodies dropped into troughs of
scalding water. I sat with the other kids in the back of a jeep on a
kangaroo-shooting excursion, and as the bodies piled up under our feet, I
remember the blood of the kangaroos soaking my green felt boots dark
red. The cruelty shocked me to the core - in fact, it was this which first
made me aware of my core, a still, silent, inner place of watching,
beyond speech. But it did not diminish the overwhelming sense of
enchantment that this place awakened in me. (Much, much later, I was to
discover that the old station had had a similar effect on many of the
people who had been associated with it.) For the enchantment, and the
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heightened feeling of being alive that accompanied it, arose from the fact
that animals - and the uncompromising land which decided their fate were the almost exclusive focus of everyone's life there, and the carnage,
for all its horror, was part of that all-consuming involvement.
When I was fifteen, my family moved into the inner city, and both my
rural life, and my visits to the sheep station, ceased. However our new
home overlooked extensive parklands, and I set up house with a dog in
an old Victorian loft in our backyard, so the transition was not unduly
traumatic. It was not until I was eighteen, and I abandoned my home and
my country to live in London, that a keen sense of loss and deprivation at
last set in. I moved in with a friend who leased a top-storey studio in the
Kings Road in Chelsea, and for various reasons I was soon trapped in the
life I had reluctantly chosen to lead there. The apartment was without a
garden, without the slightest glimpse of green from its high windows.
The grand old building in which it was located was legendary as one of
the nerve-centres of the London 'underground'. Artists, writers and rock
musicians congregated there, and every night, till dawn, the entire
building was shaken with musical reverberations from the nightclub in
the basement. People were embarked on what were for them exciting
adventures with sex and drugs. The joint was unquestionably jumping.
With comings and goings at all hours, residents and visitors alike were
charged to the eyeballs with the fizz of glamour, the intoxication of
notoriety and celebrity.
I alone, it seemed, languished. I felt deadened. Without any trees in
sight, with all presence and memory of animals expunged from this
world, without even a proper sky above me (the London sky appearing
more like a low ceiling than the soaring invitation to infinity to which I
was accustomed in Australia), I felt truly 'underground', buried alive. My
spirit, with its lifelong habit of expansiveness, had to submit for the first
time to grey urban confinement, to a world built exclusively to human
specifications, in which no court of appeal existed beyond sociallyprescribed perceptions and perspectives. There was here no turning out
to a wider world of subtle voices and signals, a world of myriad, at first
indiscernible, but with patient attention increasingly differentiated,
responsive presences. Rather, there was a turning in, and a turning up of
the volume of human-generated and human-directed self-infatuated
cacophony and chatter. This turning-in found its ultimate expression in
the essential project of the counter-culture: to transform reality into an
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inner picture show, a spectacle of hallucinatory images and sexually
induced sensations orchestrated for our private entertainment. This
project was, in fact, nothing more than a hip rendition of the old
transcendental idealism, or solipsistic anthropocentrism, of the Western
tradition, which places reality in us rather than us in reality.
I had no words, at the time, to name this human introjection of reality, or
to justify my sense of exile from a world that was truly alive, and, unlike
the one in which I found myself, a source of true enlivenment. I
especially had no words to challenge the high claims of Art on which the
counter-culture rested. Instead, I kept some snails and bare twigs in a jar
in my room, and gazed at them for months. I retreated into a state of
fantasy and intense creativity, writing and drawing obsessively, calling
up from my own deep unconscious the images and motifs I needed to
survive. I composed song cycles, and stories of origins, before I had
heard of Aboriginal dreamings. I hung around old book shops and
antique stores, seeking out illustrations and folk tales that could be
threaded into my nascent mythologies. I haunted the Natural History
Museum in South Kensington, with its layer upon layer, colonnade after
colonnade, of magical animal statuary. Whenever I found a numinous
image - an old French engraving of a lone seal, for instance, or a Chinese
painting of wild geese - I enshrined it, hanging it as a religious icon in
the gallery of my mind. Out of such gathered fragments, and out of my
own memory, imagination and dreams, I tried to recreate the sense of
enchantment that had always been the essence of my experience of the
world, and without which I did indeed find life scarcely worth living.
From the viewpoint of Western psychoanalysis, this sense of
enchantment is regressive, and signals a failure of individuation in
infancy. But to adopt this point of view is, of course, to beg the
metaphysical question. Looking back on my early years now, it seems
more plausible to me to assume that the ample opportunities for close
communion with animals that were available to me throughout my
childhood had opened me to a larger world, a world astir with presence
or presences that vastly exceeded the human. It was this direct contact
with unknowable but pervasive presence which instilled in me a sense of
the sacredness or enchantment of the world, and the potentiality for
'magic' within it. 'Magic' was, in this context, just the possibility of the
world's response - the possibility, indeed probability, that the world,
when invoked in good faith, will respond, though not necessarily in the
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manner one anticipates or with the results for which one hopes. One
should certainly not, in my view, rely on this world to fulfil requests or
afford protection, but if one entreats it simply to reveal itself, to engage
in an act of communication, then, in my experience, it will generally do
so, though in its own ever-unpredictable way. I learned this as a child,
through the receptiveness that my animal familiars created in me, and it
filled my whole being with a sense of being accompanied, of never being
alone, a sense of background love, akin to the background radiation of
which physicists speak. This is a 'love' which has nothing to do with
saving us from death and suffering, or with making us happy. From the
viewpoint of the world, death and suffering are just inevitable
concomitants of individual life. The point for individuals, from this
perspective, is not to seek to evade these inevitabilities, but to reach
beyond them - to call into the silence beyond human selfhood in search
of a reply. This is the moment for which the world has been waiting, and
in which it will rejoice: the moment when we ask it to speak. To receive
its reply is to enter a love far greater than the kind of protection and
indulgence that our traditional importunate forms of prayer expect, for
that reply signifies that we belong to an animate order, a pattern of
meaning, from which death cannot separate us, and to which suffering
only summons us.
I offer these concluding reflections, not as argument, but as testimony
relating to my own personal sense of the larger import of human-animal
commensality, especially when that commensality is established in
childhood. To engage with the unknowable subjectivities of animals, and
to experience their response to us, is perhaps the principal bridge to
communication with the unknowable subjectivity of the wider world. To
experience the world thus, as an ensouled or spiritual thing, will not only
direct the course of our own self-realization in the most fundamental
way; it will also ensure an attitude of profound mutuality and awed
protectiveness towards the world itself.

Notes
1. Nikkivan der Gaag, 'The Maasai and the Travellers', New
Internationalist, 266, (1995), pp. 24-25.
2. Throughout this paper I shall avoid the demeaning term 'pet', as well
as the problematic assumption that we can 'own' animals.
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3. Information supplied by Australian Companion Animal Council.
4. Reported on 'The Science Show', third episode of a series entitled
'Animal Friends', written and narrated by Dr Jonica Newby, broadcast on
ABC Radio National on 15 Feb 1997; also reported on 'Australia Talks
Back', ABC Radio National, 12 February 1997.
5. Reported on The Science Show, first episode of the series, 'Animal
Friends',1 Feb 1997.
6. The theory that many of our present day domestic animals initiated
the process of domestication themselves, in pursuit of their own
evolutionary advantage, has been explored at length in Stephen
Budiansky, Covenant with the Wild (William Morrow, New York,
1992).
7. Deborah Bird Rose, Dingo Makes Us Human (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1992).
8. 'Mixed community' is Arne Naess' term. See Arne Naess, 'Selfrealization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep and
Wolves', Inquiry 22, (1979), pp. 231-241.
9. Many works could be cited in support of this account of modernity;
see, for instance, Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature, (Harper and
Row, San Francisco, 1980); Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery
of Nature (Routledge, London, 1993), Chapters 1 and 2; Freya Mathews,
The Ecological Self (Routledge, London, 1991), Chapter 1.
10.. James Serpell, In the Company of Animals (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1996), Chapter 11.
11. See, for instance, the account of elephant's consciousness of death
in Joyce Poole, Coming of Age with Elephants (Hodder and Stoughton,
London, 1996), Chapter 19; for a more ambivalent account of
chimpanzee attitudes, see Jane Goodall, In the Shadow of Man (William
Collins, Glasgow, 1971).
12. See Budiansky, op cit.
13. I am not of course implying here that the movement to maximize
urban biodiversity should replace wilderness preservation and the
promotion of wildlife refugia. I am only suggesting that in a world in
which competition for 'undeveloped' space is progressively going to
intensify, we need to begin to tap the ecological potential of the
'developed' space.
14. The term 'object relations' is deployed in a branch of psychoanalytic
theory, known as 'object relations theory', to designate the kinds of
relations with primary others that an infant internalizes in the process of
developing its individual sense of self. It is associated with the work of
D.W. Winnicott, and later feminist theorists, such as Nancy Chodorow.
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